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After Three Rounds: 2-1 
On Tuesday, a third round came to a close 
in the California Tax Movement, but this 
time the opponents won for a change. 
Proposition 9 -Jarvis II, or Jaws II as it was 
also known - was defeated in the statewide 
popular vote by a 62-38 percent margin. 
Had it won, Prop. 9 wou  Id have been the 
third recent government-limitation 
amendment to the state constitution. Earlier 
rounds resulted in the June 1978 passage of 
Proposition 13 (the Jarvis-Gann amend-
ment) and the November 1979 passage of 
Proposition 4 (the Gann amendment). 
The erstwh i Ie coauthors, Howard Jarvis and 
Paul Gann, were divided on the next step 
after passage of their pathbreaking 
Proposition 13, which rolled back local 
.  property taxes 57 percent statewide. Gann 
(Prop. 4) preferred a patient strategy of 
opting for a long-term spending limitation 
rather than an immediate cutback, while 
Jarvis (Prop. 9) argued for an immediate 
reduction of state income taxes by 50 
percent. Perhaps voters preferred the Gann 
to the Jarvis strategy -or  perhaps the former 
option won out only because it reached the 
voters first. Despite the defeat of  Jarvis II, 
voter pressure had already persuaded the 
California legislature to adopt some of its 
features, so it is not clearthat Proposition 9's 
message was actually repudiated. 
The latest tax-reduction amendment 
contained three basic provisions. First, it 
would have required state personal-income 
tax rates not  to exceed 50 percent of  the rates 
in effect in the 1978 tax year. Second, it 
stipulated that the legislature provide a 
system of adjusting income-tax brackets to 
reflect annual changes in the California 
consumer-price index, and finally, it 
exempted business inventories from 
property taxation. To fend off  the 50-percent 
reduction, however, legislators moved early 
to pre-empt the other two issues. As early as 
1977, they changed the tax law so that 
personal-income tax brackets would be 
adjusted annually for changes in the 
California consumer-price index in excess 
of 3 percent. Then, in response to the 
Proposition-9 movement~  they removed the 
3-percent floor so that brackets wou  Id be 
fully indexed -but  only through 1981, after 
which time the 3-percent floor would be 
reinstated. Also, the legislature exempted 
business inventories by statute in 1979, 
effective in the 1980-81 property-tax year. 
Discourse via the Constitution 
Like its predecessors, Jarvis II grew out of the 
grassroots initiative process that has come to 
characterize California politics. It qualified 
easily for the June statewide ballot after Mr. 
Jarvis obtained 820,000 signatures-a 
quarter-million more than needed. Long ago, 
voters found the state constitution to be an 
effective medium through which to talk to the 
politicians. The constitutional initiative 
process has been the focal point of many 
controversial issues in California 
anti-busing, anti-pay TV, political reform, 
anti-open housing, the death penalty, as well 
as earlier attempts in 1968, 1972, and 1973 to 
limit taxes and spending. 
The overwhelming votes in favor of 
Propositions 13 and 4 carried an especially 
strong message to government. Proposition 
13 rolled back taxes on all property to one 
percent of 1975-76 market value, resulting in 
a $7-billion (57 percent) reduction in 
California property taxes. Under that initia-
tive, assessed market values can rise no more 
than two percent per year from the 1975-76 
base. (All new construction or transfers are 
reassessed at current market value.) The 
amendment locked these restrictions per-
manently into the constitution, and stipulated 
further that other taxes can be increased only 
by a two-thirds vote of the legislature (state 
taxes) or "qualified electors" (local taxes). 
Proposition 4 carried the movement 
considerably further by placing permanent spending limits on all governments and most 
special districts in California. It limited 
annual government appropriations 
(spending) to the 1978-79 fiscal-year level 
with annual adjustments only for consumer-
price increases and local population growth. 
The ceiling applied individually to the state, 
every county, city and school district, and 
most large special districts. The Gann 
amendment also included added stipulations 
to prevent circumvention: surpluses are 
returned to the taxpayers; direct fees for 
government services are free of  the limitation 
only to the extent they reflect the cost of 
providing each service; adjustments are 
made to account for changes in government 
boundaries or transferrals of functions to 
private enterprise; and voter-approved 
increases in the appropriations cei ling extend 
no more than three years without voter 
reconfirmation. 
Given the apparent stringency of 
Propositions 13 and 4, what prompted Mr. 
Jarvis to pursue a third round? The answer 
seems to lie in the failure of the earlier 
amendments to bring about major reductions 
in public expenditures within California. 
Specifically, Proposition 13's drastic 
reduction of property taxes lost much of its 
punch when the state used its rapidly  J 
accumulating surplus to "bailout" local 
governments to the tune of $4.4 billion and 
$4.9 billion, respectively, in the first two years 
of  operation. Moreover, Proposition 4's 
spending ceiling is unlikely to bite until 
several years from now, because govern-
ments inflated their 1978-79 appropriations 
bases in anticipation of its passage. 
The voter thus has not yet seen much tangible 
evidence of  reduced government spending in 
California. Although the growth rate of 
spending has declined, many voters have 
seen only the significant shift in taxes from the 
local to the state level-particularly to state 
income taxes which have been rising recently 
at a 33-percent annual rate according to 
some analysts. Although Proposition 4's 
spending ceiling will limit government 
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spending to the 1978-79 real per capita level 
(resulting in a sharp curtailment of  pasttrends 
and a gradual reduction in California 
governments' share of real  income), Proposi-
tion 9 proponents want hard evidence of  cuts 
now, particularly in light of the escalating 
state income tax. 
Effects of tax cuts 
Like Proposition 13, the new amendment 
would have resulted in an immediate roll-
back in taxes of  dramatic proportions. Hence 
a heated debate arose over the amendment's 
potential effects on the level of  the state's 
economic activity and the provision of 
government services. 
Proponents argued thata 50-percent 
reduction in (and permanent restriction on) 
state income taxes would have greatly 
stimulated private income and spending 
while eliminating government waste. The 
result, they said, would have been a 
magnified positive stimulus to statewide 
employment, production, and real incomes 
-as  was demonstrated earlier in the wake of 
Proposition 13. 
It is true that Proposition 13 stimulated the 
state's economy. But the short-run stimula-
tion came not so much from the reduction in 
the size of the public sector as from the fact 
that taxes were reduced far more than 
expenditures. In the first year alone, the state 
funded $4.9 billion (70 percent) of  the 
$7.0-billion cut in local tax revenue, by 
sharing its rapidly accumulating budget 
surplus with local governments through a 
complicated "bail out" formula. Hence, 
some short-run stimulus occurred because 
Californians received large tax cuts with a 
much smaller reduction in public 
expenditures. 
But the present state surplus is much smaller 
-on  the order of $2.1  billion, according to 
the most recent state estimate. Furthermore, 
with the prospect of  a deep recession in 1980, 
little or no increase in the surplus may be 
expected in the next fiscal year. A surplus of this size would have only partly offset the 
$4.9 billion and $4.2 billion income-tax cuts 
officially forecast for the next two fiscal years 
under Proposition 9. Thus, Proposition 9 
would have come closer than Proposition 13 
to a matched reduction in government 
receipts and expenditures 
-and its one-time stimulus accordingly 
would have been smaller. 
Tax experts are divided over whether or not a 
permanent reduction in tax receipts with a 
matching reduction in expenditures would 
provide a lasting stimulus to economic 
activity. At its simplest level, the answer 
depends on the extent to which our current 
tax structure deters incentives to work and 
invest within the private sector. Proponents of 
Proposition 9 have carried this argument to its 
extreme, utilizing the widely-touted "Laffer 
curve" devised by Professor Arthur Laffer of 
the University of Southern California. Given 
the burdensome level of  taxes, in Laffer's 
view, a reduction in statutory tax rates would 
so stimulate the economy (and reduce tax 
avoidance/evasion) that tax revenues would 
actually increase. Laffer's argument has been 
used also in support of  the Kemp-Roth tax-cut 
movement at the national level. Although his 
thesis has more merit when applied to states 
and localities (where migration is sensitive to 
tax rates), many supporters of the 
government-limitation movement argue that 
Laffer's claims are overstated. 
In contrast, California's Legislative Analyst 
took the opposite extreme in his official 
estimate of Proposition 9's effecton state-tax 
receipts by assuming no stimulus at 
all-even with a complete drawdown of the 
state budget surplus. In other words, he 
estimated the decline in state income-tax 
receipts-
$4.9 billion and $4.2 billion in the next two 
fiscal years -by  assuming that receipts 
would decline exactly in tandem with the 
50-percent reduction in rates. The truth 
probably lies somewhere in between this 
estimate and the "Laffer curve" estimate. 
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Size of government 
Proponents of  the tax-limitation movement 
argue that to focus only on the sensitivity of 
tax revenues to statutory rates is to miss the 
underlying issues of the tax-limitation 
movement~the  choices between public 
and private decision-making in the 
economic, political, and social arena. To 
these individuals, a redistribution of 
production (even of the same goods) from 
public to private enterprise would enhance 
productivity, and ultimately, total real 
income. Moreover, the private sector would 
likely produce goods more highly valued by 
society. But the controversy also deals with 
other issues: whether government expendi-
tures should be directed toward current 
consumption (for example, transfer 
payments) or toward activities that enhance 
our future capacity to produce (such as 
effective education or highways), and 
whether government intervention leads to a 
more or less equitable (or efficient) 
distribution of income. 
By most estimates (except, of course, Mr. 
Laffer's), Propositon 9 would have led to a  -
reduction of 1  O-per-cent or more in state-and-
local government expenditures after 
drawdown of  the state surplus. As the 
election date approached, Californians saw 
the main issues as these: Who would gain 
and lose most from the tax and expenditure 
reductions? What public services or transfer 
payments might be cut? Might the state 
merely replace the lost income-tax revenues 
with a less-desirable combination of higher 
sales and business taxes. And finally, might 
Proposition 4 by itself provide an adequate 
control on the size of government? In 
answering these questions, voters were 
wi  II ing to settle at this time for the already 
legislated portions of Proposition 9, and to 
reject the proposal for a massive income-tax 
cut. But further rounds in the tax revolt may 
yet be fought in California, as well as in other 
states and the nation's capital. 
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(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and liabilities 
large Commercial Danks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
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Loans to individuals 
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Other securities* 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
+  10,423  +  8.3 
+  11,702  +  11.3 
+  2,079  +  6.8 
+  8,811  +  23.5 
+  1,998  +  9.1 
- 472  - ,29.4 
1,396  18.0 
+  117  +  0.8 
+  687  +  1.7 
+  110  +  0.4  , 
- 3,473  - 11.6  \ 
+  13,602  + 26.9 
+  14,083  +  34.1 
+  5,491  +  31.6 
Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended  Comparable 
of Daily Figures 
Member Dank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+  )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+  )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 





5/14/80  year-ago period 
285  31 
4  218 
281  187 
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